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INTRODUCTION
For over the past two decades, Congress has been extending
federal jurisdiction over crime control to encourage states to work
more aggressively to attack the problem of violent crimes committed
by repeat offenders and criminals serving shortened sentences.1
Congress enacted the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) in 1984
to promote this important federal sentencing principle of more
severely punishing violent repeat offenders.2 The ACCA is a recidivist
statute, or a “three strikes law,” that substantially raises the penalty for
*J.D. candidate, May 2007, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; B.S., high honors, Computer Information Systems, DePaul University,
May 2004. I am deeply indebted to Professor Hal R. Morris for making this
Comment possible. I would also like to thank my parents and brother for their
unconditional love and support.
1
H.R. REP. NO. 105-157; JOANNE O’BRYANT, DOMESTIC SOCIAL POLICY
DIVISION, ISSUE BRIEF FOR CONGRESS, CRIME CONTROL: THE FEDERAL RESPONSE, 3
(2003), http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/society/crime/crimegun1.pdf.
2
See United States v. Taylor, 495 U.S. 575, 581 (1990); United States v.
McCall, 439 F.3d 967, 969 (8th Cir. 2006); H.R. Rep. No. 98-1073, at 1 (1984),
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.A.N. 3661.
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possession of a firearm if a defendant has three previous convictions
for a violent felony.3 In the two decades after the ACCA’s enactment,
the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals consistently interpreted the
ACCA’s term “violent felony” to encompass intentional violent acts
that present a serious potential risk of physical injury to others.4 In
2004, the United States Supreme Court in Leocal v. Ashcroft held that
drunk driving offenses are not crimes of violence5 under the
Comprehensive Crime Control Act (“CCCA”), provided that the
offenses either do not have an intent component or require only a
showing of negligence.6 Nonetheless, in 2005, the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit misapplied precedent and misinterpreted the
ACCA’s statutory text by expanding the ACCA’s predicate violent acts
to include negligent drunk driving.7
3

18 U.S.C. § 924(e); United States v. Caldwell, No. 97-5252, 2000 WL
331950, at *8 n.3 (6th Cir. Mar. 23, 2000). Along with violent felonies, a serious
drug offense also qualifies as a predicate act under the ACCA. This Comment,
however, will focus strictly on violent felony convictions as the case at issue, United
States v. Sperberg, focuses on a violent felony conviction as predicate act.
4
See United States v. Sacko, 178 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1999) (sexual assault); United
States v. Altsman, 89 Fed. App. Appx. 357 (3d Cir. 2004) (attempted kidnapping);
United States v. Wardick, 350 F.3d 446 (4th Cir. 2003) (assault); United States v.
Matthews, 278 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2002) (reckless aggravated assault); United States
v. Coles, 97 Fed. Appx. 665 (7th Cir. 2004) (armed robbery); United States v.
McKinney, 328 F.3d 993 (8th Cir. 2003) (attempted burglary); United States v.
Greenberg, 104 Fed. Appx. 34 (9th Cir. 2004) (robbery); United States v. Maddox,
388 F.3d 1356 (10th Cir. 2004) (escape); United States v. Lee, 208 F.3d 1306 (11th
Cir. 2000) (robbery and burglary). This list of cases is not meant to be an exhaustive
list of violent felonies, but is meant to illustrate the type of intentionally, violent acts
Courts of Appeals have considered a predicate violent felony under the ACCA.
5
The Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Bell, 187 Fed. Appx. 610, 613 (7th
Cir. 2006), has stated that the terms “crime of violence” and “violent felony” are
interchangeable. Thus, for the purposes of this Comment, these terms are also
interchangeable and reference to a statute referring to a “violent felony” or one to a
“crime of violence” is distinction without a difference.
6
Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004).
7
This Comment focuses on drunk driving offenses that lack injury or death but
are made felonious by state recidivist laws. Normally, charges of driving under the
influence which lack any injury or death are misdemeanors, but many states have
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The Seventh Circuit in United States v. Sperberg categorized the
offense of drunk driving as a violent crime thereby qualifying drunk
driving as a predicate violent felony subject to recidivist sentence
enhancement under the ACCA.8 In expanding the ACCA’s predicate
violent acts, the Seventh Circuit relied on its decision in United States
v. Rutherford where it held that drunk driving is a crime of violence
under § 4B1.2(a)(2) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. 9 The
court noted that although Rutherford dealt with the Sentencing
Guidelines, the language of § 4B1.2(a)(2) is identical to that of §
924(e) of the ACCA, and, thus, there is “no basis for reading the
provisions differently.”10 Despite the Supreme Court’s holding in
Leocal that drunk driving is not a crime of violence under the
CCCA,11 the Seventh Circuit distinguished Sperberg from Leocal
concluding that the CCCA employed operatively different language.12
The Seventh Circuit erred in relying on Rutherford and
categorizing drunk driving as a violent felony under the ACCA.13 In
light of drunk driving’s non-violent nature, the Seventh Circuit’s
expansion of the ACCA’s predicate acts blurs the distinction between
crimes of violence and crimes of neglect and allows excessive
penalties for crimes that Congress did not intend for heightened
punishment.14 Part I of this Comment will trace the relevant judicial
and legislative history necessary to analyze the Sperberg decision. Part
II will set out the factual background to the issues raised in Sperberg
and detail the reasoning of the court. Lastly, Part III will discuss why
Sperberg was incorrectly decided: first, the Seventh Circuit should
have followed the Supreme Court’s suggestion in Leocal that the
recidivist statutes, or “three strikes laws,” which make a repeat DUI charge a felony.
16B David Kramer, Am. Jur. Constitutional Law, § 656 (2d ed. 2006).
8
United States v. Sperberg, 432 F.3d 706 (7th Cir. 2005).
9
United States v. Rutherford, 54 F.3d 370 (7th Cir. 1995).
10
Sperberg 432 F.3d at 709.
11
Leocal, 543 U.S. 1.
12
Sperberg 432 F.3d at 709.
13
See id.
14
See Leocal, 543 U.S. at 11 (referring to the consequences of interpreting §
16 of the CCCA to include accidental or negligent conduct).
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predicate acts under the ACCA should not be enlarged to include
crimes of neglect; second, the Seventh Circuit should have interpreted
the ACCA under a ejusdem generis analysis rather than interpreting
the ACCA’s pertinent clause in isolation; and finally, drunk driving
should not be considered a violent felony considering Congress’
legislative intent in enacting the ACCA.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The State of the Law Prior to United States v. Sperberg
1. The Armed Career Criminal Act
In 1984, Congress observed that nearly 25 million American
households, or three out of every ten, were affected by crimes
involving theft and violence.15 Congress explained that it had become
apparent that a large number of these crimes were committed by a very
small number of chronic offenders.16 As a response to protect the
public from the continuing crimes of these habitual offenders,
Congress enacted the ACCA to supplement the states’ law
enforcements efforts against armed “career” criminals whose
livelihood is “crime for profit.”17 The ACCA raises the penalty for
possession of a firearm by a felon from a maximum of ten years in
prison to a mandatory minimum of fifteen years and a maximum of
life in prison without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence
allowed, if the defendant has three previous convictions for a violent
felony or a serious drug offense.18 Section 924(e)(2)(B) of the ACCA
defined the term “violent felony” to mean:
15

H.R. Rep. No. 98-1073, at 1 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.A.N. 3661.
Id.
17
See United States v. Taylor, 495 U.S. 575, 581 (1990); Brief of Appellant at
12, United States v. Ivan Excel Mason, No. 05-3879 (8th Cir. Dec., 2005); H.R. Rep.
No. 98-1073, at 3.
18
18 U.S.C. § 924(e); United States v. Caldwell, No. 97-5252, 2000 WL
331950, at *8 n.3 (6th Cir. Mar. 23, 2000).
16
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any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year . . . that
(i) has an element the use, attempted use, or threatened
use of physical force against the person of another; or
(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of
explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents
a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.19
The Supreme Court has made it easier for courts to determine
which crimes constitute a “violent felony” by instructing that state
convictions for the felonies listed in the § 924(e) can be used as
predicate violent felonies to raise the defendant’s sentence if the court
finds that the state statute defining the defendant’s prior offenses
corresponds to the generic meaning of those crimes listed in § 924(e)
as predicate offenses.20 Determining which crimes fall under the
“otherwise involves” clause, however, has not been so simple since the
Supreme Court has left the question solely for its lower courts to
determine.21
2. The ACCA and United States v. Doe
Since the ACCA’s enactment, the federal courts of appeals have
repeatedly been presented with the question of what types of offenses

19

18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii) (emphasis added). The “otherwise involves”
clause is the operative clause in which this Comment focuses on.
20
Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602. State convictions may also be used as predicate
violent felonies if the charging paper and jury instructions actually required the jury
to find all the elements of the generic meaning of the offense to convict the
defendants.
21
See Jondavid S. DeLong, What Constitutes “violent felony” for the Purpose
of Sentence Enhancement Under the Armed Career Criminal Act (18 U.S.C.A. §
924(e)(1)), 119 A.L.R. FED. 319 (1994).
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constitute violent felonies under the ACCA.22 In 1992, the First Circuit
in United States v. Doe held that a felon in possession of a firearm is
not itself a “violent felony” under § 924(e) of the ACCA.23 Writing for
the court, then Chief Judge Breyer observed that the statute gives
several specific examples such as burglary, arson, extortion, use of
explosives and then adds “or otherwise involves conduct that presents
a serious potential risk of physical injury to another,” and stated that
simple possession of a firearm did not fit within the literal language of
the ACCA.24 Judge Breyer explained that simple firearm possession
usually does not involve violence, and the same risk of physical harm
that accompanies burglary or arson cannot easily be imagined to
accompany conduct that normally constitutes simple firearm
possession.25 Judge Breyer specifically provided the example of drunk
driving and explained that Congress did not intend to enhance
sentences based on such non-violent convictions because § 924(e) of
the ACCA “calls to mind a tradition of crimes that involve the
possibility of more closely related, active violence.”26 Although Judge
Breyer recognized a strong argument that a previously convicted felon
who possesses a gun reveals a willingness to break the law again, he
stressed that the legislature expressed this concern in the context of
criminalizing the conduct and not on whether the felony was “violent”
for sentence enhancement purposes.27 Additionally, Judge Breyer
22

See United States v. Sacko, 178 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1999) (sexual assault);
United States v. Altsman, 89 Fed. App. Appx. 357 (3d Cir. 2004) (attempted
kidnapping); United States v. Wardick, 350 F.3d 446 (4th Cir. 2003) (assault);
United States v. Matthews, 278 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2002) (reckless aggravated
assault); United States v. Coles, 97 Fed. Appx. 665 (7th Cir. 2004) (armed robbery);
United States v. McKinney, 328 F.3d 993 (8th Cir. 2003) (attempted burglary);
United States v. Greenberg, 104 Fed. Appx. 34 (9th Cir. 2004) (robbery); United
States v. Maddox, 388 F.3d 1356 (10th Cir. 2004) (escape); United States v. Lee,
208 F.3d 1306 (11th Cir. 2000) (robbery and burglary).
23
United States v. Doe, 960 F.2d 221 (1st Cir. 1992).
24
Id. at 224 (emphasis in original) (referring to 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)).
25
Id.
26
Id. at 225.
27
Id. at 226.
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noted that there is no legislative evidence that Congress’ use of the
words “serious potential risk,” instead of the more traditional language
“substantial risk,”28 was thereby intended to include gun possession
crimes or drunk driving.29
3. The United States Sentencing Guidelines
The concern over the problem of violent crimes committed by
repeat offenders which prompted Congress to enact the ACCA was the
same concern which prompted it to enact the Sentencing Reform Act
of 1984 (“SRA”).30 While the ACCA’s purpose is mainly to be “tough
on crime,” however, the SRA was enacted to serve multiple purposes:
first, ensuring that defendants serve their complete sentences; second,
establishing a uniform sentencing scheme by narrowing the wide
disparity in sentences imposed across federal jurisdictions; and third,
creating a proportional system that “imposes appropriately different
sentences of criminal conduct of different severity.”31
As part of the SRA, Congress created the United States
Sentencing Commission (“Commission”), an independent body within
the judicial branch, and charged it with “establish[ing] sentencing
policies and practices for the Federal criminal justice system.”32
Congress set general goals for federal sentencing and imposed upon
the Commission a variety of responsibilities.33 Among those
responsibilities, Congress directed the Commission to establish
maximum and minimum sentences for certain offenses based on the
characteristics of a crime.34 The Commission implemented this
28

Id. (referring to the language in 18 U.S.C §§ 16, 3142(f), 3156(a)(4).
United States v. Doe, 960 F.2d 221, 226 (1st Cir. 1992).
30
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1A1.1.
31
Id.
32
United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 753 (1997).
33
Id.
34
Id.; see Gilles R. Bissonnette, “Consulting” the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines After Booker, 52 UCLA. L. REV. 1497, 1506-07 (2006) (citing to 28
U.S.C. § 944(b)(1) (2000)(“The Commission…shall, for each category of offense
involving each category of defendant, establish a sentencing range”).
29
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directive by promulgating the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
(“Guidelines”) in 1987.35
Like the ACCA, the Guidelines also contain a career offender
provision which specifies a sentence enhancement for repeat offenders
who have been convicted of at least three “crimes of violence.”36
Section 4B1.2(a) of the Guidelines defines the term “crime of
violence” with language precisely identical to that of § 924(e) of the
ACCA.37 Section 4B1.2 provides that the:
term “crime of violence” means any offense under
federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a
term exceeding one year, that-(1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person of
another, or
(2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion,
involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves
conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical
injury to another.38
The language of § 924(e) and the language of § 4B1.2 were not always
identical, however.39 Initially, the language of § 4B1.2(1)(ii) was
identical to 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) of the CCCA. 40 The change did not
occur until 1989 when the Sentencing Commission amended
§4B1.2(1) to language identical to § 924(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii) of the
35

See LaBonte, 520 U.S. at 753.
U.S.S.G §4B1.1.
37
U.S.S.G. §4B1.2.
38
U.S.S.G. §4B1.2
39
Bazan-Reyes v. INS, 256 F.3d 600, 608 (7th Cir. 2001).
40
18 U.S.C. §16(b) provides that a crime of violence includes “any . . . offense
that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force
against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing
the offense.” See also Bazan-Reyes, 256 F.3d at 608.
36
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ACCA.41 In amending the original § 4B1.2(1), the Sentencing
Commission specifically noted that the amendment was not intended
to change the substance of the guideline, but only to clarify its
meaning.42 The Commission intended to clarify that courts must be
guided by actual conduct when determining a “violent felony,” and
that mere possession of a firearm is not a crime of violence under §
4B1.2(1)(ii), 43 just as it is not a crime of violence under the ACCA.44
Unlike the ACCA, however, the Guidelines are advisory and do
not require a judge to impose mandatory minimum.45 In 2004, the
Supreme Court in United States v. Booker excised the mandatory
provisions of the Guidelines and held that although judges must still
consider the Guidelines, they are not required to follow the Guidelines
in any particular case.46 In exercising discretion to follow the
Guidelines, a judge may consider the offense behavior and the
offender’s characteristics.47 Taking the offense level and criminal
history category together, the Guidelines specify a recommended

41

Section 924(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii) defines “violent felony” as any crime that (i) has
as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the
person of another; or (ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives,
or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury
to another.
42
Id. (citing to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual app. C at 106-07 (1991)).
43
See Stinson v. U.S., 508 U.S. 36, 46 (1993); United States v. Garcia-Cruz,
40 F.3d 986, 989 (9th Cir. 1994); United States Sentencing Commission, 2005
Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual, Chapter 4, Part B (2005),
http://www.ussc.gov/2005guid/gl2005.pdf.
44
See United States v. Bell, 966 F.2d 703 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. Doe,
960 F.2d 221 (1st Cir. 1992); also United States v. Powell, 813 F. Supp. 903 (Mass.
Dist. Ct. 1992) (extending the First Circuit’s reasoning in Bell and Doe to the Bail
Reform Act and holding that felon in possession of a firearm is not a crime of
violence).
45
See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 259-60 (2004).
46
543 U.S. at 259-60; Lucien B. Campbell and Henry J. Bemporad, Office of
the Federal Public Defender, Western District of Texas, An Introduction to Federal
Sentencing 2 (2006), http://www.ussc.gov/training/intro9.pdf.
47
U.S.S.G. § 1A2.
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narrow sentencing range in which a judge should impose a sentence.48
The Guidelines allow the judge to enhance a recidivist’s sentence
based on a prior conviction without having it mentioned in the
indictment or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.49
Additionally, unlike the ACCA, the Guidelines allow for the
possibility of supervised release.50 Thus, although the language of the
ACCA and the Guidelines are identical, the application of the
Guidelines in determining a sentence in an advisory fashion may
produce a shorter sentence than the ACCA’s mandatory minimum of
fifteen years.51
4. The Guidelines and United States v. Rutherford
Three years after the First Circuit decided Doe, the Seventh
Circuit in United States v. Rutherford was asked to determine as a
matter of first impression whether a vehicular assault committed by a
drunk driver constitutes a crime of violence under § 4B1.2 of the
Guidelines.52 Answering in the affirmative, the majority53 explained
that drunk driving poses serious risks to other motorists and
pedestrians.54 As such, drunk driving satisfied subsection (ii) of §
4B1.2(a) because the offense “involves conduct that presents a serious

48

See United States Sentencing Commission, 2005 Federal Sentencing
Guidelines Manual, Chapter 5, Part A (2005),
http://www.ussc.gov/2005guid/gl2005.pdf.
49
Booker, 543 U.S. at 244 (specifically exempting a prior conviction from
impermissible judicial factfinding); Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. 224, 226-27, 247
(1998).
50
U.S.S.G §4B1.1; see Rutherford, 54 F.3d at 371.
51
See Oral argument recording. United States v. Ronald V. Sperberg, No. 044135. (7th Cir. Dec., 2005). Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals,
http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/fdocs/docs.fwx?caseno=04-4135(enter docket no. 044135).
52
Rutherford, 54 F.3d 370.
53
Id. at 371 (JJ. Cummings and Rovner joining in the majority).
54
Id. at 376-77.
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potential risk of physical injury to another.”55 The majority noted,
however, that qualifying felony drunk driving as a crime of violence
under the “otherwise” clause was “somewhat troubling,” and invited
the Commission to re-evaluate its definition of crime of violence to
determine whether drunk driving should qualify as a predicate act of
crime of violence.56 Judge Easterbrook observed in his concurrence
that the defendant Rutherford was not charged with drunk driving, but
rather was charged with a crime of assault57 which resulted from
driving under the influence and causing serious bodily injury to
another with a motor vehicle.58 Thus, while the majority concluded
that all drunk driving offenses are crimes of violence, Judge
Easterbrook suggested that a crime of violence existed in Rutherford’s
case only because of the presence of first degree assault and injury.59
But ten years later, Judge Easterbrook referred to his Rutherford
concurrence saying, “[m]y concurrence is all very nice, but there was a
reason why I was writing for myself. The decision, of course, is the
decision of the majority. And there it is.”60
At the time Rutherford was decided, neither the Seventh Circuit
nor any other court had determined whether a vehicular assault
committed by a drunk driver or any other similar offense constitutes a
crime of violence under § 4B1.2 of the Guidelines.61 Since Rutherford,
55

Id.
Id. at 377.
57
Id. at 378 (J. Easterbrook concurring). Alabama Code § 13A-6-20(a)(5)
provides that a person commits the crime of assault in the first degree if, while
driving under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance or any combination
thereof in violation of Section 32-A-191 he causes serious bodily injury to the
person of another with a motor vehicle.
58
United States v. Rutherford, 54 F.3d 370, 378 (7th Cir. 1995) (J. Easterbrook
concurring) (stating that “[d]runk driving is a lesser included offense that [first
degree assault while driving under the influence] creates”).
59
See id.
60
Oral argument recording. United States v. Ronald V. Sperberg, No. 04-4135.
(7th Cir. Dec., 2005). Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals,
http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/fdocs/docs.fwx?caseno=04-4135(enter docket no. 044135).
61
Rutherford, 54 F.3d at 375.
56
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however, the Fifth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have all found
Rutherford’s reasoning persuasive and have held DUI as a “crime of
violence” within the meaning of § 4B1.2.62 Each of those circuits
explicitly referred to Rutherford’s analysis that drunk driving is
inherently dangerous and, as such, is a violent felony under the
Guidelines because of its inherent risk of presenting physical injury to
another.63 Additionally, the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Chauncey
adopted a line of reasoning similar to that in Judge Easterbrook’s
Rutherford concurrence and held involuntary manslaughter resulting
from a DUI as a “crime of violence” under § 4B1.2.64
5. The CCCA and Leocal v. Ashcroft
Nine years after Rutherford, in 2004, the federal courts were again
faced with the question of whether drunk driving constitutes a “crime
of violence.”65 This time, however, the question arose in the context of
the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 (“CCCA”).66 The
CCCA broadly reformed the federal sentencing system by revising bail
and forfeiture procedures to ensure that criminals serve an appropriate
amount of time in prison.67 Congress used the term “crime of
violence” in numerous places throughout the CCCA to define the
elements of particular offenses.68 Title 16 U.S.C. § 16 of the CCCA
defines “crime of violence” as:
62

United States v. DeSantiago-Gonzalez, 207 F.3d 261 (5th Cir. 2000); United
States v. McCall, 439 F.3d 967 (8th Cir. 2006); United States v. Moore, 420 F.3d
1218 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v. McGill, 450 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 2006).
63
See DeSantiago-Gonzalez, 207 F.3d at 264; McCall, 439 F.3d at 972;
Moore, 420 F.3d at 1221; McGill, 450 F.3d at 1281.
64
See United States v. Chauncey, 420 F.3d 864 (8th Cir. 2005).
65
Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004).
66
Id. at 6.
67
Id.; see also H.R. REP. NO. 105-157, at 3 (1997) (stating that the CCCA
“eliminated parole in the federal criminal justice system and required offenders
convicted of federal crimes to serve at least 85 percent of their sentences”).
68
Leocal, 543 U.S. at 6 (providing several examples of how Congress
employed the term “crime of violence” to define the elements of particular offenses,
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(a) an offense that has as an element the use, attempted
use, or threatened use of physical force against the
person or property of another, or
(b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its
nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force
against the person or property of another may be used
in the course of committing the offense.
The question of whether drunk driving was a crime of violence
under this section of the CCCA made its way to the United States
Supreme Court, which answered in the affirmative.69 The Court in
Leocal v. Ashcroft held that drunk driving offenses are not crimes of
violence under § 16, provided that the offenses either do not include a
mens rea component or require only a showing of negligence in the
operation of vehicle.70 The Court focused on § 16’s emphasis on the
use of physical force, which the court concluded requires active
employment against the person or property of another.71 The Court
found that a DUI offense could not include this requisite type of
physical force because while one may actively employ something in an
accidental manner, it is much more unusual to say that a person may
actively employ physical force against another by accident.72 Thus, the
Court concluded, § 16’s key phrase, “the use . . . of physical force
against the person or property of another,” suggests a higher degree of
intent than the negligent or merely accidental conduct found in drunk
driving.73

such as: 18 U.S.C. § 1959 which prohibits threats to commit crimes of violence in
aid of racketeering activity and § 3142(f) which requires a pretrial detention hearing
for those alleged to have committed a crime of violence).
69
Id. at 12-13.
70
Id.
71
Id. at 9.
72
Id.
73
Id. at 10.
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In footnote seven of the Court’s opinion, the Court compared the
type of conduct referred to § 4B1.2 of the Guidelines to the type of
conduct in § 16(b) of the CCCA, and observed that § 4B1.2 refers to
the risk that an accident may occur when an individual drives drunk
and § 16(b) refers to the risk that a individual may use force against
another in committing a DUI offense.74 Despite its distinction,
however, the Court favorably cited Doe later in its opinion by citing to
Judge Breyer’s observation that drunk driving was not a “violent
felony” under the ACCA because § 924(e) “calls to mind a tradition of
crimes that involve the possibility of more closely related, active
violence.”75 Referencing Doe with approval, the Court stated that the
term “crime of violence” combined with § 16’s emphasis on the use of
physical force “suggests a category of violent, active crimes that
cannot be said naturally to include DUI offenses.”76 Thus, drunk
driving was not a crime of violence under the CCCA because § 16’s
language requires a higher mens rea than the merely accidental or
negligent conduct involved in a DUI offense.77
Additionally, the Court provided the example Congress’ use of the
term “crime of violence” in § 101(h) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (“INA”) to support its holding that drunk driving was
not a “crime of violence.”78 Under § 101(h), Congress added the term
“crime of violence” to a list that distinguished drunk driving from
crimes of violence.79 Section 101(h) defines the term “serious criminal
offense” to mean:
(1) any felony;
(2) any crime of violence, as defined in section 16 of
title 18; or
74

Id. n.7.
Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11 (2004) (citing United States v. Doe, 960
F.2d 221, 225 (1st Cir. 1992)).
76
Leocal, 543 U.S. at 11.
77
Id. at 10 n.7.
78
Id. at 12.
79
8 U.S.C. § 1101(h).
75
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(3) any crime of reckless driving or of driving while
intoxicated under the influence of alcohol or of
prohibited substances if such crime involves personal
injury to another.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(h).80
Because Congress chose to list drunk driving resulting in injury in
a distinct provision separate from “crimes of violence,” the Court
explained that interpreting “crime of violence” under § 16 to
encompass DUI offenses would leave § 101(h)(3) practically devoid
of significance.81 Thus, the Court concluded, the distinct provision for
these separate offenses bolsters its conclusion that § 16 does not itself
encompass DUI offenses.82
II. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT CATEGORIZES DRUNK DRIVING
AS A VIOLENT FELONY IN UNITED STATES V. SPERBERG
In 2005, despite the Supreme Court’s holding in Leocal that
negligent drunk driving offenses are not crimes of violence, the
Seventh Circuit categorized drunk driving as a violent felony subject
to recidivist enhancement under the ACCA.83 In United States v.
Sperberg, the Seventh Circuit expanded the ACCA’s predicate violent
acts and allowed heightened punishments to be imposed on defendants
with a criminal history of negligent crimes.84

80

Leocal, 543 U.S. at 12 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(h)) (emphasis in original).
Id. (citing Duncun v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001)) (stating “[a]s we
must give effect to every word of statute wherever possible...the distinct provision
for these offenses under § 101(h) bolsters our conclusion that § 16 does not itself
encompass DUI offenses).
82
Leocal, 543 U.S. at 12.
83
United States v. Sperberg, 432 F.3d 706, 709 (7th Cir. 2005).
84
Id.
81
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A. Facts
Roland Sperberg pled guilty to possessing a firearm,85 which
normally carries a maximum penalty of 10 years of imprisonment.86
Sperberg was sentenced to 210 months, however, because the district
judge87 concluded that he had been convicted of at least three other
“violent felonies” under the ACCA.88 Sperberg had a lengthy criminal
conviction record and many of his convictions may have qualified as a
predicate act under the ACCA’s definition of “violent felony.”89 The
district judge specified three in particular, including one for drunk
driving in Wisconsin.90
Wisconsin treats operating while under the influence91 (“OWI”) as
a misdemeanor but elevates the charge to a felony for repeated OWI
convictions.92 Thus, after seven OWI convictions, Wisconsin elevated
Sperberg’s eighth OWI conviction to a felony under state law.93
Sperberg contended that his drunk driving conviction was not a crime
of violence under the ACCA.94
B. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit Opinion
Writing for the court, Judge Easterbrook stated that Rutherford,
which held that drunk driving is a “violent felony” under § 4B1.2, was
85

Id. at 707.
18 U.S.C. § 922(g).
87
Sperberg was convicted by guilty plea in the United States District Court for
the Western District of Wisconsin, Shabaz, J., of possessing a firearm despite prior
felony convictions. See Sperberg, 432 F.3d 706.
88
Id. at 707.
89
Id.
90
Id. at 707, 709.
91
WISCONSIN DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, DRUNK DRIVING LAW 0.08
(2006), Oct. 3, 2006,
http://www.dot.wisconsin.gov/safety/motorist/drunkdriving/law.htm
92
Sperberg, 432 F.3d at 708.
93
Id.
94
Id. at 707.
86
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controlling.95 The Seventh Circuit noted that although Rutherford dealt
with the Guidelines, the language and context of § 4B1.2(a) of the
Guidelines is identical to that of § 924(e) of the ACCA, and, thus,
there is “no basis for reading the provisions differently.”96 The Seventh
Circuit also distinguished Sperberg from the Supreme Court’s decision
in Leocal, which held that drunk driving is not a violent felony under §
16 of the CCCA.97 The Seventh Circuit emphasized the difference in
statutory language of § 16, which speaks of “using” force whereas §
924(e) speaks of conduct that “presents” a serious potential risk of
physical injury to another.98 The Seventh Circuit explained that the
Supreme Court thought that to “use” force is to apply it deliberately,
which excluded the offense of drunk driving because although driving
is deliberate, the application of force is not.99 By contrast, the Seventh
Circuit stated, § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)’s “presents” asks about consequences
rather than whether the offender deliberately applied force.100 Because
of this difference, the Seventh Circuit found that Rutherford survives
Leocal as “materially different language justifies a different
interpretation.”101
The Seventh Circuit noted, however, that Sperberg’s best
argument was that Leocal cited Doe with apparent approval, which
stated that § 924(e) as a whole “calls to mind a tradition of crimes that
involve the possibility of more closely related, active violence” which
cannot be said to include drunk driving.102 Indeed, the Seventh Circuit
mentioned that not all crimes fit Doe’s description of “crime of
violence,” and the catch-all “otherwise” clause in subsection (ii) “calls
for risky activity to be classified with more traditional crimes of

95

Id. at 709.
Id.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Id. (quoting United States v. Doe, 960 F.2d 221, 225 (1st Cir. 1992)).
96
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violence.”103 But the court stated that several circuits have decided104
the question whether drunk driving is a violent felony under §
924(e)(2)(B)(ii), and if the Seventh Circuit were to switch sides, “it
would more likely aggravate than eliminate a conflict.”105 Therefore,
the court stated, Rutherford stands controlling and shall remain the
circuit’s position.106
III. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT ERRED IN RELYING ON RUTHERFORD
Sperberg incorrectly followed Rutherford’s reasoning in holding
that drunk driving is a crime of violence under the ACCA: first,
Rutherford’s holding that drunk driving is crime of violence under §
4B1.2 of the Guidelines is questionable in light of Leocal; second, the
offense involved in Sperberg was mere negligent drunk driving while
the offense involved in Rutherford was vehicular assault with injury
resulting from drunk driving; and lastly, sentence enhancement under
the Guidelines is not nearly as severe as it is under the ACCA.107
Sperberg’s enlarging of the predicate acts under the ACCA raises
serious concerns of overly severe punishments because it opens the
103

Sperberg, 432 F.3d at 709.
Although the courts are now in agreement, at the time Sperberg was
decided, the circuits had split as to whether drunk driving was a violent felony for
purposes of the ACCA. The Tenth Circuit in United States v. Moore, 420 F.3d 1218,
1224 (10th Cir. 2005) held that drunk driving was a violent felony, and the Eighth
Circuit in United States v. Walker, 393 F.3d 819, 828 (8th Cir. 2005) held that it was
not. Since Sperberg, the Eighth Circuit reheard en banc in United States v. McCall,
397 F.3d 1028 (8th Cir. 2006) and rejected the analysis in Walker and held that
drunk driving qualified as a violent felony under § 924(e)(B)(ii).
105
Sperberg, 432 F.3d at 709.
106
Id.
107
See United States v. Leocal, 543 U.S. 1 (2004); United States v. Rutherford,
54 F.3d 370 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Sperberg, 432 F.3d 706 (2005); Oral
Argument of Christopher Van Wagner, Attorney for Defendant-Appellant, Oral
argument recording. United States v. Ronald V. Sperberg, No. 04-4135. (7th Cir.
Dec., 2005). Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals,
http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/fdocs/docs.fwx?caseno=04-4135(enter docket no. 044135).
104
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door to a host of crimes of neglect that were not meant for heightened
punishment.108 Under Sperberg’s holding, a person may be exposed to
severe, heightened punishment under the ACCA for negligent drunk
driving despite the ACCA’s purpose of targeting violent career
offenders who commit intentional, active crimes for profit.109 Because
Sperberg raises such serious implications, the Seventh Circuit should
revisit Sperberg and analyze § 924(e)(B)(2)(ii) of the ACCA by
following the Supreme Court’s suggestion in Leocal that the predicate
acts under the ACCA should not be enlarged to include drunk driving
and other crimes of neglect.110 Moreover, interpreting §
924(e)(B)(2)(ii)’s “otherwise involves” clause to include only crimes
similar in nature to the enumerated crimes which precedes it
demonstrates that negligent crimes do not fit within the meaning of the
ACCA.111 Finally, tracing the legislative history also reinforces the
conclusion that the ACCA should not be expanded to include drunk
driving and other crimes of neglect.112
A. The Predicate Acts under the ACCA in a Post-Leocal World
Sperberg should not have relied on Rutherford in interpreting §
924(e)(B)(2)(ii) because Rutherford was not decided in a post-Leocal
world where drunk driving is not considered a crime of violence under
§ 16(b) of the CCCA.113 Rutherford interpreted § 4B1.2 of the
Guidelines to include drunk driving as a violent felony, but Rutherford
was decided nine years before the Supreme Court’s decision in

108

See Sperberg, 432 F.3d at 709.
See H.R. Rep. 98-1073, at 3.
110
Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11 (2004) (citing United States v. Doe, 960
F.2d 221, 225 (1st Cir. 1992)).
111
See Federal Maritime Comm’n v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 734
(1973) (instructing that “catch-all” provisions should be interpreted within the
categories similar in type to those specifically enumerated within the statute).
112
See United States v. McCall, 439 F.3d 967, 979 (8th Cir. 2006) (Lay, J.
dissenting).
113
Leocal, 543 U.S. at 11.
109
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Leocal.114 Post-Leocal, drunk driving would not be considered a
violent felony under § 4B1.2 of the Guidelines because the
Commission specially noted that § 4B1.2(a) should still have the same
substantive meaning as § 16(b) of the CCCA despite its amended
language identical to the ACCA. 115 Because § 4B1.2(a) in effect has
the same substantive meaning as § 16(b), interpreting § 4B1.2(a) to
include drunk driving would thus contravene Leocal’s holding that
drunk driving is not a “crime of violence” under § 16(b).116 In light of
Rutherford’s questionable holding, the Sperberg court should not have
relied on Rutherford but rather should have relied on Leocal’s
suggestion that Doe should be followed. 117
Doe correctly held ACCA’s predicate acts should not be enlarged
to include crimes of neglect that raise only the possibility of violence
because interpreting otherwise would blur the distinction between the
violent crimes that Congress sought to distinguish for heightened
punishment and other crimes. 118 Although Sperberg was correct in
concluding that the word “presents” in § 924(e)(B)(2)(ii) focuses on
the consequences of hurting a person, the court’s main inquiry should
have been whether the conduct by its nature involves a serious
potential risk of physical harm against others. 119
Rutherford, for example, correctly observed that subsection (ii) of
the “crime of violence” definition focuses on the conduct involved in
the offense, and its sole concern is with the actions of the offender.120
114

See Leocal, 543 U.S. 1; United States v. Rutherford, 54 F.3d 370 (7th Cir.

1995).
115

U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual app. C at 106-07 (1991) (stating that in
amending the original § 4B1.2(1), the Sentencing Commission specifically noted
that the amendment was not intended to change the substance of the guideline, but
only to clarify its meaning).
116
Leocal, 543 U.S. 1.
117
Id. at 11.
118
Id. (stating interpreting § 16 to include accidental or negligent conduct
would blur distinction between violent crimes and negligent crimes for purposes of
sentence enhancement); Doe, 969 F.2d at 225.
119
See Sperberg, 432 F.3d at 709.
120
United States v. Rutherford, 54 F.3d 370, 376 (7th Cir. 1995).
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The Rutherford majority, however, failed to distinguish that the
defendant Rutherford was not charged with drunk driving, but rather
was charged with a crime of assault resulting from drunk driving and
causing serious bodily injury to another with a motor vehicle.121 The
nature of the drunk driving offense in Rutherford includes assault and
injury, while the type of the drunk driving at issue in Sperberg lacked
any injury.122 The lesser included offense of mere drunk driving,
without assault or injury, simply does not involve a serious potential
risk of physical harm to others that is associated with assault resulting
from drunk driving.123
As Doe pointed out, the consequences of physical harm are
significantly more likely to accompany inherently more dangerous
crimes, such as burglary or arson, than to accompany accidental or
negligent crimes such as drunk driving where there is no assault or
injury.124 Thus, the reckless disregard in § 924(e) relates not the
general conduct or to the possibility that harm will result from a
person’s conduct, but to the serious potential risk that physical harm
that will result from committing the offense.125
The Leocal Court provides the classic example of burglary to
illustrate such a difference: the offense of burglary falls within the
meaning of “crime of violence” not because the offense can be
committed in a generally reckless way or because someone may be
injured, but because burglary, by its nature, involves a substantial risk
that a burglar will deliberately use force against a victim and create
physical harm.126 In contrast, mere drunk driving, without any assault
or injury, does not have the accompanying serious potential risk that
physical harm will result.127 Although burglars are inherently more
dangerous when they violate gun possession laws, “drunk drivers are
121

Id.
Id.; See Sperberg, 432 F.3d 706.
123
See United States v. Doe, 960 F.2d 221, 225 (1st Cir. 1992).
124
Id. at 224-25.
125
Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 10 (2004).
126
Id.
127
Doe, 960 F.3d at 225.
122
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not inherently more dangerous to society when they violate gun
possession laws.”128 As Doe emphasized, there is no reason to believe
that Congress meant to enhance sentences based on proof of drunk
driving convictions because the term violent felony “calls to mind a
tradition of crimes that involve the possibility of more closely related,
active violence.”129
The tension between the Supreme Court’s contrary initial
observation in footnote seven that the risks associated with the conduct
in § 16(b) of the CCCA are different from those of § 4B1.2 of the
Guidelines, and the Court’s later favorable citation to Doe’s
observation that DUI is not a “crime violence” under § 924(e) of the
ACCA, “underscores the unsettled nature of whether Congress
intended to include drunk driving convictions in the category of
violent felonies as defined in § 924(e).”130 Although Leocal’s
observation in its footnote seven and its approval of Doe seem
contradictory, the contradiction can be reconciled if one interprets the
Court’s distinction of the risks of drunk driving under § 4B1.2 of the
Guidelines to be referring to risks associated with drunk driving that
involves assault and injury to another.131 This conclusion is reinforced
by the Court’s referencing to Doe with approval and its ultimate
holding that a “crime of violence” requires a higher mental state than
the merely accidental or negligent conduct involved in a DUI
offense.132 Thus, although the predicate act of drunk driving involving
assault and injury may “present a serious potential risk of physical
injury to another,” merely accidental or negligent drunk driving does
not. 133
Moreover, the Leocal court focused on the conduct that creates a
“substantial risk” under § 16(b) of the CCCA and found that drunk

128

McCall, 439 F.3d at 974 (Lay, J. dissenting).
See Doe, 960 F.3d at 225.
130
McCall, 439 F.3d at 982 (Lay, J. dissenting).
131
Leocal, 543 U.S. at 11.
132
Id.
133
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).
129
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driving did not carry such a substantial risk.134 Section 924(e) of the
ACCA, however, focuses on the higher threat of “serious potential
risk.”135 Used as an adjective, the definition of the term “serious”
means “dangerous” or “potentially resulting in death or other severe
consequences” such as serious bodily harm.136 In contrast,
“substantial,” in tort’s substantial-factor context, refers to the causation
that exists when one's conduct is an important or significant
contributor to another’s injuries.137 As drunk driving does not carry a
“substantial risk” that physical harm will result, it is less likely that
drunk driving would carry the higher “serious potential risk” that
physical harm will result.138 Therefore, as Judge Breyer observed in
Doe, Congress’ use of the words “serious potential risk” instead of the
more traditional “substantial risk” shows that Congress did not intend
to include non-violent crimes such as drunk driving within the scope
of the ACCA.139
Leocal further points out that INA § 101(h)’s list of “serious
criminal offenses” includes distinct and separate provisions for a
“crime of violence” and for driving under the influence.140 The
structure of INA § 101 demonstrates that Congress distinguished
drunk driving offenses involving injury from “crimes of violence” and
knew that drunk driving was separate from and not subsumed within
the term “crimes of violence.”141 Thus, the structure of INA § 101
demonstrates that Congress knows how to include drunk driving in a
separate provision if it intends to qualify drunk driving as a predicate
act for sentence enhancement under the ACCA.142
134

Leocal, 543 U.S. at 11.
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).
136
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
137
Id.
138
See United States v. Doe, 960 F.2d 221, 226 (1st Cir. 1992).
139
Id.
140
Leocal, 543 U.S. at 12.
141
Brief for Petitioner, at 34-36, Josue Leocal v. John D. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1
(2004) (No. 03-583).
142
See id.
135
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However, Judge Easterbrook’s apprehension with aggravating a
conflict by not finding drunk driving as a crime of violence is
understandable.143 After all, all of the circuits who have been asked to
determine whether drunk driving constitutes a crime of violence have
answered in the affirmative.144 But even if the Supreme Court were to
agree with the circuits’ holding of drunk driving as crime of violence
under § 4B1.2(a) of the Guidelines, the Seventh Circuit could still find
that drunk driving is not a crime of violence under § 924(e) of the
ACCA because these seemingly contradictory holdings can be
reconciled.145 Although § 4B1.2(a) of the Guidelines and § 924(e) of
the ACCA have identical language, their effects on sentence
enhancements have drastically different results.146 The ACCA’s
mandatory fifteen-year minimum imposes a much harsher penalty than
would likely happen under a judge’s interpretation of the Guidelines
and application of it an advisory fashion.147
Under the Guidelines, the sentencing judge would take into
account a number of factors determined by Congress to be pertinent to
sentencing for those charged with possession of firearm and who also
have previous convictions.148 The Guidelines establishes different
offense levels based on certain characteristics of the offense such as
whether the gun was a machine gun, whether the defendant committed
the act after sustaining two previous felony convictions, etc.149 The
Guidelines then specify a number of points that take into account
143

United States v. Sperberg, 432 F.3d 706, 709 (7th Cir. 2005);
United States v. DeSantiago-Gonzalez, 207 F.3d 261 (5th Cir. 2000);
United States v. McCall, 439 F.3d 967 (8th Cir. 2006); United States v. Moore, 420
F.3d 1218 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v. McGill, 450 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 2006).
145
See Oral Argument of Christopher Van Wagner, Attorney for DefendantAppellant, Oral argument recording, United States v. Ronald V. Sperberg, No. 044135. (7th Cir. Dec., 2005). Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals,
http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/fdocs/docs.fwx?caseno=04-4135(enter docket no. 044135).
146
Id.
147
Id.
148
21A Laura Dietz et. al., Am. Jur. Criminal Law, § 859 (2d ed. 2006).
149
U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a).
144
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certain characteristics of the defendant’s criminal history background
and categorizes the points into different criminal history categories.150
Taking the base offense level and the criminal history category
together, a judge would impose a sentence within a specified range of
months.151 Under this framework, a recidivist defendant likely would
be sentenced to a penalty far less than he would be under the
ACCA.152
To illustrate, consider the hypothetical153 of Defendant Drinker:
Defendant Drinker was an alcoholic. Drinker was a
frequent patron of a bar in Indiana which was across the
state border and three miles away from his home in
Illinois. Although Drinker could have easily walked the
distance, Drinker believed he was able to handle his
alcohol and stay in control while driving. The area
between the bar and Drinker’s home was also an area
known for high incidences of crime, and Drinker
thought he would be much safer driving rather than
walking home while inebriated. Between 1988 and
2000, Drinker was arrested and charged five times for
driving under the influence. None of Drinker’s DUI
offenses resulted injuries, deaths, or damage to
property. After the first two DUI misdemeanor
convictions, the court raised Drinker’s three subsequent
DUI offenses to class 4 felonies for which Drinker
served a total of seven years in prison (three years each
for two felonies, and one year for the other felony), 90
days of probation, and paid the court a total of $5,000
in fines. In 2004, one year after Drinker was released
150

U.S.S.G. at § 4A1.1.
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual, Chapter 5, Part A (2005),
http://www.ussc.gov/2005guid/gl2005.pdf.
152
See id.; 18 U.S.C. § 924.
153
For a well-articulated hypothetical explaining the mechanics of the
Guidelines, see Gilles R. Bissonnette, “Consulting” the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines After Booker, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1497, 1506-07 (2006).
151
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from serving his last DUI conviction, Drinker decided
he would no longer drive but would walk to and from
his favorite bar. Because the area was unsafe, Drinker
bought a handgun from a friend who sent it to Illinois
from Florida. Drinker carried the handgun with him to
and from the bar every night. One night Drinker was
arrested and charged with possession of a firearm under
18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). Drinker’s only other offenses in
his criminal history are the two DUI misdemeanors and
three DUI felonies. Drinker pled guilty hoping to get a
lenient sentence from the court.
If the judge decided to apply the Guidelines, Drinker would have
a base offense level of 24 because the Guidelines specify a base level
of 24 if a defendant committed the offense of possession of a firearm
“subsequent to sustaining at least two felony convictions of…a crime
of violence.”154 The Guidelines specify a number of points for certain
offense behavior: Drinker would have 6 points for the two DUI
felonies that he served three years each on because the Guidelines
specify “3 points for each prior sentence of imprisonment exceeding
one year and one month.”155 The judge would then add 2 points for the
DUI felony that he served one year on because the Guidelines specify
adding “2 points for each prior sentence of imprisonment of at least
sixty days [that have not already been counted].”156 Finally, the
Guidelines would specify the judge to add 2 more points since Drinker
was arrested just one year after he was released from serving time on
his last DUI conviction.157 Drinker would have a total of 10 criminal
history points putting him in a criminal history category of V.158 For a
154

U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(2).
U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(a).
156
U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(b).
157
U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(e).
158
See United States Sentencing Commission, 2005 Federal Sentencing
Guidelines Manual, Chapter 5, Part A (2005),
http://www.ussc.gov/2005guid/gl2005.pdf.
155
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defendant with a base offense level of 24 and a criminal history
category of V, the judge would impose a sentence between 92-115
months.159 Thus, under the Guidelines, Drinker would receive a
sentence between approximately 7.5 years and 9 years.160
If, on the other hand, Drinker had been charged under the ACCA,
the judge would be required to impose at least a fifteen-year
mandatory minimum, or 180 months.161 This is nearly double the
amount that Drinker would serve under the Guidelines.162 Although §
4B1.2(a) of the Guidelines and § 924(e) of the ACCA have the same
identical language, their effects are drastically different as the Drinker
hypothetical illustrates.163 The Seventh Circuit should distinguish
drunk driving under § 924(e) of the ACCA from drunk driving under §
4B1.2(a) of the Guidelines because a crime of violence under the §
924(e) should encompass only truly violent crimes that deserve such
severely heightened punishment.164 The difference between § 4B1.2(a)
and § 924(e) is a crime of violence that considers an advisory
Guidelines-type enhancement and a crime of violence that mandates a
more severe ACCA-type enhancement.165 Because the ACCA imposes
such an excessive penalty, the Seventh Circuit should have
distinguished Sperberg from Rutherford by concluding that drunk
159

Id.
See United States Sentencing Commission, 2005 Federal Sentencing
Guidelines Manual, Chapter 5, Part A (2005),
http://www.ussc.gov/2005guid/gl2005.pdf.
161
See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).
162
See United States Sentencing Commission, 2005 Federal Sentencing
Guidelines Manual, Chapter 5, Part A (2005),
http://www.ussc.gov/2005guid/gl2005.pdf.
163
See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e); United States Sentencing Commission, 2005
Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual, Chapter 5, Part A (2005),
http://www.ussc.gov/2005guid/gl2005.pdf.
164
See United States v. Doe, 960 F.2d 221, 225 (1st Cir. 1992).
165
See Oral Argument of Christopher Van Wagner, Attorney for DefendantAppellant, Oral argument recording, United States v. Ronald V. Sperberg, No. 044135. (7th Cir. Dec., 2005). Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals,
http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/fdocs/docs.fwx?caseno=04-4135(enter docket no. 044135).
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driving is not the type of conduct that warrants an ACCA-type penalty
enhancement.166 The Seventh Circuit should reconcile Rutherford in
limiting the types of drunk driving crimes deserving of heightened
punishment under the ACCA by adopting Judge Easterbrook’s line of
reasoning in his Rutherford concurrence and hold that a crime of
violence exists where there is both assault and injury.167
B. Applying Ejusdem Generis
Despite Leocal’s holding that drunk driving is not a “crime of
violence,” Sperberg expanded the predicate acts under the ACCA to
include the drunk driving as a predicate violent crime.168 The effect of
Sperberg is that § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)’s “otherwise involves” clause has
been enlarged to include crimes of neglect despite the list of violent,
active crimes that precedes the clause.169 The term “otherwise,”
however, is an elastic term,170 and Leocal instructs that when
interpreting a statute that features an elastic term, the context of the
term should be construed in light of the terms surrounding it.171 Thus,
the catch-all “otherwise involves” clause should be construed in light
of the nature of violent, active crimes because specific statutory
language should control more general language when there is conflict
between them.172
166

Id.
See United States v. Rutherford, 54 F.3d 370, 378 (7th Cir. 1995).
168
United States v. Sperberg, 432 F.3d 706, 709 (7th Cir. 2005).
169
See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).
170
See United States v. McCall, 439 F.3d 967, 979 (8th Cir. 2006) (Lay, J.
dissenting) (citing to WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1984))
(observing that “when used as an adverb, ‘otherwise,’ means (1) ‘in a different way
or manner’; (2) ‘in different circumstances’; and (3) ‘in other respects.’ Depending
on which definition of "otherwise" one chooses to apply, and which elements of the
chosen definition one emphasizes, the "otherwise involves" provision can be read to
support both the "any crimes" and "similar crimes" interpretations.
171
Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 9 (2004).
172
Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n, Inc. v. Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. 327
(2002).
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The Supreme Court instructs that “catch-all” provisions should be
interpreted within the categories similar in type to those specifically
enumerated within the statute.173 When general words follow an
enumeration of more specific items, the “sensible and long
established” maxim of ejusdem generis limits the understanding of the
general words to refer to the items belonging to the same class that is
defined by the more specific terms in the list.174 The doctrine of
ejusdem generis does not apply “where there are no specific terms
followed by general terms,175 where all of the terms in the statute are
general,176 or where the terms in question are both specific in
nature.”177 Similarly, the doctrine should not be applied to restrict the
general terms following a class of particular terms where the particular
terms exhaust the class.178
Section 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) enumerates four specific crimes of
burglary, arson, extortion, and those involving use of explosives
followed by the catch-all provision “or otherwise involves conduct
that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”179
The specific crimes do not exhaust the types of “violent felonies” that
may fall under the catch-all “otherwise involves” provision.180 For
173

Federal Mar. Comm’n v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 734 (1973).
Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 917 (1994); see also Washington State Dep’t
of Soc. & Health Servs. V. Guardianship Estate of Keffler, 537 U.S. 371, 384 (2003)
(“Where general words follow specific words in a statutory enumeration, the general
words are construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects
enumerated by the proceeding specific words”); Norfolk & Western R. Co. v. Train
Dispatchers, 499 U.S. 117, 129 (1991); McCall, 439 F.3d at 976 (Lay, J. dissenting).
175
82 John Bourdeau et al., Corpus Juris Secundum § 329(2006); see also State
v. Tin Yan, 355 P.2d 25 (1960); Burke v. Sullivan, 265 P.2d 203 (1954); Bergen
County Bd. Of Taxation v. Borough of Bogota, 250 A.2d 440 (Law Div. 1969).
176
Bourdeau, supra note 175; see also Accident & Cas. Ins. Co. of Winterthur,
Switzerland v. Cook, for Use of State, 33 S.E.2d 571 (1932); McNamara v. State,
181 N.E. 512 (1932).
177 Bourdeau, supra note 175; see also Slocum v. Dep’t of Soc. Welfare, 580
A.2d 951 (1990).
178
Bourdeau, supra note 175.
179
18 U.S.C § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).
180
See id.
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example, armed robbery may well be a violent crime that presents a
serious potential risk of physical injury to another but armed robbery
is not included amongst the enumerated specified crimes.181 Analyzing
924(e)(2)(B)(ii) under the principle of ejusdem generis, the “otherwise
involves” clause should not be read in isolation but should be
construed to embrace only crimes similar in nature to the enumerated
violent crimes.182 In light of drunk driving’s non-violent nature, the
“otherwise involves” clause should not be interpreted to encompass
drunk driving offenses which are made felonious by state recidivist
statutes but do not have elements of assault or injury to other
persons.183 Rather, the “otherwise involves” clause should be read to
encompass only serious violent crimes that are similar to nature to
burglary, arson, extortion, and those involving use of explosives.184
C. Congressional Intent in Enacting the ACCA
The legislative history of the ACCA strongly reinforces the
conclusion that the “otherwise involves” clause should be interpreted
to include only crimes similar in nature to the enumerated crimes that
precede it.185 The history of the ACCA reveals that Congress focused
its efforts on targeting career offenders—those who commit serious
crimes as a means of livelihood186 and whose occupation solely
consists of “crime for profit.”187 Interpreting the “otherwise involves”
clause to include drunk driving and other crimes of neglect would thus
make little sense, as no one can possibly make a livelihood from
driving drunk since drunk driving “is not the result of plan, direction,
181

Id.
Guardianship Estate of Keffler, 537 U.S. at 384; United States v. McCall,
439 F.3d 967, 979 (8th Cir. 2006) (Lay, J. dissenting).
183
United States v. McCall, 439 F.3d 967, 979 (8th Cir. 2006) (Lay, J.
dissenting).
184
Id.
185
Id.
186
See United States v. Taylor, 495 U.S. 575, 587-8 (1990).
187
H.R. Rep. 98-1073.
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or purpose but of recklessness at worst and misfortune at best.”188
Including drunk driving as predicate violent felony within the ACCA’s
purview would not only be unusual, but it would open the door to
permitting severe penalties for negligent crimes that were not meant
for heightened punishment.189 Because interpreting the “otherwise
involves” clause in isolation produces an unusual and unjust result, the
legislative history of the ACCA should be consulted “to verify that
what seems to us an unthinkable disposition . . . was indeed unthought
of.”190
When Congress enacted the ACCA in 1984, the sentence
enhancement provision was contained in § 1202 and was targeted at
convicted felons possessing a firearm who had three previous
convictions for “robbery or burglary.”191 In 1986, § 1202 was
recodified as 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) by the Firearms Owners’ Protection
Act, and just five months later, was amended again by the Career
Criminal Amendments Act of 1986 to its present form.192 The 1986
amendment expanded the predicate offenses triggering sentence
enhancement from “burglary or robbery” to “a violent felony or
serious drug offense.”193
The Report of the House Committee on the Judiciary, H.R. Rep.
No. 99-849, (“Report”), indicates that during the 1986 debate
hearings, Congress intended § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) to encompass offenses
against people and § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) to encompass offenses against

188

United States v. Rutherford, 54 F.3d 370, 372 (7th Cir. 1995).
See United States v. Doe, 960 F.2d 221, 225 (1st Cir. 1992).
190
Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527 (Scalia, J.
concurring).
191
See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 581 (citing to Pub.L. 98-473, ch. 18, 98 Stat. 2185,
18 U.S.C.App. § 1202(a) (1982 ed., Supp. III) (repealed in 1986 by Pub.L. 99-308, §
104(b), 100 Stat. 459).
192
Taylor, 495 U.S. at 581; United States v. McCall, 439 F.3d 967, 979 (8th
Cir. 2006) (Lay, J. dissenting).
193
Taylor, 495 U.S. at 581; United States v. McCall, 439 F.3d 967, 979 (8th
Cir. 2006) (Lay, J. dissenting).
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property.194 The Report explains that Congress intended §
924(e)(2)(B)(i) to include such “felonies involving physical force
against a person such as murder, rape, assault, robbery, etc.”195 The
Report further explains that the other major discussion involved which
offenses against property would qualify as predicate acts under the
ACCA.196 The Subcommittee agreed to add “State and Federal crimes
against property such as burglary, arson, extortion, use of explosives
and similar crimes as predicate offenses where the conduct involved
presents a serious risk of injury to a person.”197 Congress’
determination that § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) should encompass offenses
directed against property and its reference to “similar crimes”
indicates that the “otherwise involves” clause was intended to
encompass crimes similar in nature to the violent, active crimes
against property such as burglary, arson, extortion, and crimes that
involves the use of explosives—not negligent crimes such as drunk
driving.198
CONCLUSION
Driving under the influence of alcohol is among America’s
deadliest crimes as alcohol and automobiles can be a lethal
combination.199 DUI is a nationwide problem and the legislature has
194

See McCall, 439 F.3d at 979 (Lay, J. dissenting) (citing to H.R. Rep. No.

99-849).
195

H.R. Rep. No. 99-849.
Id. (emphasis in original).
197
Id. (emphasis added); Ellen Martin, U.S. DOT Releases 2005 Data on
Alcohol-Related Traffic Fatalities; State, National Statistics Underscore Severity of
Drunk-Driving Problem, NHTSA, September 23, 2006, http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov
(follow “In the News” hyperlink; then follow “U.S. DOT Releases 2005 Data on
Alcohol-Related Traffic Fatalities; State, National Statistics Underscore Severity of
Drunk-Driving Problem” hyperlink).
198
H.R. Rep. No. 99-849.
199
Ellen Martin, U.S. DOT Releases 2005 Data on Alcohol-Related Traffic
Fatalities; State, National Statistics Underscore Severity of Drunk-Driving Problem,
NHTSA, September 23, 2006, http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov (follow “In the News”
hyperlink; then follow “U.S. DOT Releases 2005 Data on Alcohol-Related Traffic
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put effort into prohibiting it and imposing appropriate penalties.200
Drunk driving is with little doubt a very reckless act that poses serious
risks to other motorists and pedestrians.201 “After all,” the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has said, that is “why it is
forbidden.”202 But the dangers and seriousness of drunk driving “does
not warrant [the court’s] shoehorning it into statutory sections where it
does not fit.”203 Drunk driving simply does not fit within the meaning
of “violent felony” as defined by the ACCA. Sperberg incorrectly
relied upon Rutherford, which is questionable in a post-Leocal world.
The enhancements under the advisory Guidelines are also not nearly as
severe as the mandatory minimum and maximum set by the ACCA.
The Seventh Circuit’s expansion of the ACCA’s predicate acts to
include drunk driving raises serious concerns of opening the door to
include a host of negligent crimes that were not meant for severely
heightened punishment. By reading the “otherwise involves” clause in
isolation and disregarding Congress’ intent in enacting the ACCA,
Sperberg produces an unusual, and unjust, result of punishing drunk
drivers under an act targeted at rehabilitating chronic violent offenders
and protecting the public from those whose occupation is crime for
profit.

Fatalities; State, National Statistics Underscore Severity of Drunk-Driving Problem”
hyperlink).
200
Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 13 (2004).
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United States v. Sperberg, 432 F.3d 706, 708 (7th Cir. 2005).
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Leocal, 543 U.S. at 13.
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